Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2011

Jed A. Gressman v. State of Utah : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nancy L. Kemp; Patrick B. Nolan; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General; Attorneys for Appellant.
Douglas G. Mortensen; Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen and Jeppson; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Gressman v. Utah, No. 20110965 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2985

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JED A. GRESSMAN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20110965-SC
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellant.

Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Juab County, State of Utah, Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Presiding

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

NANCY L. KEMP (5498)
PATRICK B. NOLAN (2422)
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: 801-366-0533

DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN (2329)
Matheson, Mortensen, Olson &Jeppson, PC
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: 801-363-2244
H

ILED

M-TAU ™ f .
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUG 15 2012

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JED A. GRESSMAN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
CaseNo.20110965-SC

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent/Appellant.

:

Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Juab County, State of Utah, Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Presiding
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

NANCY L. KEMP (5498)
PATRICK B. NOLAN (2422)
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Telephone: 801-366-0533

DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN (2329)
Matheson, Mortensen, Olson & Jeppson, PC
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: 801-363-2244
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

v

ARGUMENT

1

I.

THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED RES JUDICATA BY
ERRONEOUSLY CONFLATING THE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS FOR
VACATUR AND FACTUAL INNOCENCE
..

1

II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT OVERCOME THE STATUTE'S
PLAIN MEANING UNDER THE COURTS TRADITIONAL RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . ...........-......
.... .4

III.

WITHOUT GIVING PRECLUSIVE EFFECT TO THE VACATUR
ACTION, THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO SUSTAIN THE
TRIAL COURTS DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE
A.

Neither the County Attorney's Motion to Vacate nor the
State's Failure to Appeal Establishes Factual Innocence

8

,. 9

B.

The Striking of the Victim's Affidavit in the State's Summary
Judgment Motion Does Not Establish Plaintiffs Factual Innocence . . . . 10

C.

The State Challenges Only Issues of Law and Therefore has
No Obligation to Marshal the Evidence Supporting the Trial
Court's Findings of Fact

12

The Sole Evidentiary Basis for the Trial Court's Grant of
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff was the Transcript of the
Vacatur Hearing

13

The Factual Innocence Statute Requires and Evidentiary Hearing
if the State Does Not Stipulate to a Petitioner's Factual Innocence

15

D.

E.

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.

V.

THE SURVIVAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR NAME-CLEARING
PURPOSES DOES NOT ENTITLE HIS WIDOW TO STATUTORY
COMPENSATION OR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

17

PLAINTIFF HAS ASKED FOR NEITHER SUMMARY DISPOSITION
OF HIS APPEAL NOR SANCTIONS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL . . . 22

CONCLUSION . . . .

23

ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A: Enrolled Copy, H.B. 307, Factual Innocence Amendments,
2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012)
ADDENDUM B: Factual Innocence Amendments: Hearing on H.B. 307 Before
the H. Law Enforcement and CriminalJustice Cmte., 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012)

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Fell v. Union Pac. Rwy.,
32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907)

..,.

20-21

Jensen v. Cunningham,
2011UT17,250P.3d465

3

Myers v. Myers,
2011 UT 65, 266 P.3d 806

4

Orvis v. Johnson,
2008 UT 2, 177 P.3d 600

11

Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co.,
2010 UT 43, 234P.3d 1105 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Soriano v. Graul,
2008 UT App 188, 186 {.3d 960

3

State v. Reyes,
2005 UT33, 116 Pr3d 305

..

9

State v. Winward,
907P.2d 1188(UtahApp. 1995)

4

Winters v. Schulman,
2001 UT App 105, 2001 WL 357124

21

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
H.B. 307, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012)

5-6, 15, 17, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107

18

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401.5 (West Supp. 2011)

11

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 (West 2009 and Supp. 2011) . . . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404 (West 2009 and Supp. 2011)

11
..

11

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-405 (West 2009) . . .

20

UtahR. App. P.10

22

Utah R. App. P.24

12, 15, 18

UtahR. App. P.30

.....

.

,. 21

Utah R. Civ. P.l 1

22

Utah R. Civ. P.56

10, 12

Utah R. Civ. P. 65C

15
OTHER AUTPIORITIES CITED

Audio Floor Debate, Third Reading, S.B. 16,2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008)

19

Factual Innocence Amendments: Hearing on H.B. 307 Before the H Law Enforcement
and CriminalJustice Cmte., 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012)
, 5-8

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(F)(1)
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements, and
Type Style Requirements
1.

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App.
P.24(f)(l) because this brief contains 6,147 words, excluding the parts of
the brief exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1)(B).

2.

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b)
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using WordPerfect X5 in 13 Times New Roman.

Nancy L.Kemp
Assistant Attorney General

Dated:

<t\\S\W

V
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JED A. GRESSMAN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
CaseNo.20110965-SC

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED RES JUDICATA BY
ERRONEOUSLY CONFLATING THE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS FOR
VACATUR AND FACTUAL INNOCENCE
A fundamental flaw infects the trial court's decision: its conflation of two distinct
and independent legal actions, one for vacatur of plaintiff s conviction and the separate
action for a declaration of factual innocence. See Aplt. Brief at 11-12. Just as the vacatur
court erroneously treated the vacatur action as if it were a continuation of plaintiff s
criminal case, see Aplt. Brief at 13 n.S, the trial court erroneously treated plaintiffs
factual innocence case as if it were a continuation of the vacatur action. But those actions
are not one and the same. They comprise different elements and have different standards
of proof. The findings necessary to sustain vacatur are different from and not sufficient
to prove factual innocence. See Aplt. Brief at 10-13. Therefore, the trial court's
application of res judicata was error.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs attempt to show that the State could have raised its res judicata
argument in the trial court falls short. He bases this contention on three arguments first
raised in the reply memorandum supporting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment: (1)
that the affidavit of plaintiff s victim should be disregarded (see Aplee. Brief at 11 and its
Add. B at 6-8); (2) that the vacatur of plaintiff s conviction served as "factual evidence"
of his alleged innocence (see Aplee. Brief at 11 and its Add. B at 8 (quotation in Add.
B)); and (3) that the county prosecutor's actions in moving to vacate the charges against
plaintiff bar the State from contesting plaintiff s factual innocence (see Aplee. Brief at 11
and its Add. B at 9-10). But those arguments do not address the elements of res judicata.
Although plaintiffs trial court reply memorandum argued generally that "the doctrines of
waiver, issue and claim preclusion, equitable estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata
all apply to criminal actions as they do in civil proceedings," R. 245, plaintiff did not
specifically argue res judicata, and his attempt here to establish res judicata ignores
critical elements of that preclusion doctrine. Even in the trial court, plaintiff argued in
passing only that "the parties involved in the 1996 proceedings are the same parties now
before the Court. In that proceeding, factual evidence was presented supporting Mr.
Gressman's innocence." R. 245.
But res judicata requires more. If plaintiff s argument invokes claim preclusion, it
falls short by failing to demonstrate that the claim sought to be barred-here, the factual
innocence claim-was available in the first action. Because a statutory claim for factual
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innocence did not exist and was thus not available at the time of plaintiff s vacatur action,
claim preclusion cannot apply. If plaintiff s argument sounds in issue preclusion instead,
it fails because plaintiff cannot show that the issue of factual innocence is identical to the
issue of vacatur. In either case, plaintiffs passing mention of a handful of legal theories,
unaccompanied by any meaningful analysis of their individual elements, was insufficient
to raise res judicata in the trial court as a dispositive issue-especially because it was
raised for the first time in plaintiff s summary judgment reply memorandum. See Soriano
v. Graul, 2008 UT App 188,111, 186 P.3d 960 (declining to address issue where the
litigant "first made mention of it, in a cursory manner, in her reply brief to the trial
court.").
Notably, plaintiffs summary judgment motion and supporting memorandum raised
only a single reference to any species of preclusion doctrine, contained in a single
sentence and citing no legal authority: "Gressmari's factual innocence is fthe law of the
case'and should be followed by this Court." R. 170. But law of the case is not applicable
in the context of separate actions. As this Court explained in Jensen v. Cunningham,
"[t]he law of the case doctrine applies to preclude litigation of an issue when the identical
issue was litigated earlier in the same case'' Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, \ 49
n.5, 250 P.3d 465 (emphasis added). The present case is not the same case as the vacatur
action. Even if the issues in the two cases were identical-and they are not-law of the case
would not apply.

3
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In short, the State had no reasonable opportunity to address in the trial court the
issue of res judicata, raised only in plaintiffs reply memorandum supporting his summary
judgment motion. Even if it had, plaintiff did not establish there that all elements of res
judicata were met. Consequently, the trial court's application of res judicata on the basis
of the vacatur action was error that is within this Court's jurisdiction to correct.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT OVERCOME THE
STATUTE'S PLAIN MEANING UNDER THE COURT'S
TRADITIONAL RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Plaintiff argues that, in interpreting the language of the factual innocence statute,
this Court should not look beyond comments made in legislative committee hearings. But
to do so would violate this Court's caution against using legislative history as the primary
means to discern legislative intent. As the Court has explained, if a statute's "text is
ambiguous, we may look to legislative history to inform our construction of the statutory
language. But the legislative history is not law. It is at most of secondary relevance in
informing our construction of the law, which is found in the statutory text." Myers v.
Myers, 2011 UT 65, f 28, 266 P.3d 806 (internal citation omitted). See also State v.
Winward, 907 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah App. 1995) ("Only when the statute's language is
ambiguous will we seek guidance from the legislative history and policy
considerations.").
The enrolled copy of the factual innocence amendments unambiguously announces
at the outset that "[t]his bill makes clarifying amendments to factual innocence

4
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provisions." Factual Innocence Amendments, H.B. 307, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012) at
1:11 (Add. A). It is well established that amendments which clarify or amplify how the
law should have been interpreted from the outset may be retroactively applied, ai id doubts
about the character of an amendment are resolved by examining the amendment's title or
preamble. Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, f 43, 234 P.3d 1105.
Regardless of what was said in the preliminary committee hearings, the legislature
ultimately chose to pass the bill expressly as a clarification. Because the legislature's
chosen language is not ambiguous, resort to legislative history as determinative of
legislative intent is both unnecessary and inappropriate.
Moreover, the legislative history is not as one-sided as plaintiff suggests. Assistant
Attorney General Scott Reed explained to the House Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice Committee that the amendments were "not an overhaul by any means." Certified
Transcript, Factual Innocence Amendments: Hearing on HB. 307 Before the H. Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice Cmte., 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012) (Add. B) at 2.1
He then had an exchange with Representative Litvak, who stated, without contradiction,

1

All references are to the certified transcript plaintiff filed with the Court on July 9,
2012, appended to this brief as Addendum B. The inaccurate, uncertified transcript
excerpts contained in Add. A to plaintiffs response brief are the subject of a motion to
strike filed on June 27, 2012, on which the Court has deferred ruling. See Order of July
16, 2012. Plaintiff has filed no certified transcript of the February 28, 2012 Senate
Judiciary, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Standing Committee hearing, but relies
only on the uncertified excerpts also included in that addendum and subject to the State's
motion to strike.
5
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his understanding that the statutory compensation payments in the original legislation
were intended only for the wrongfully incarcerated individual. See Add. B at 4.
Representative Litvak then asked Mr. Reed to explain the provisions regarding survival of
factual innocence claims solely for name-clearing purposes. Mr. Reed acknowledged that
"there hasn't been a clear statement of public policy with regard to whether or not
petitioner must be alive or dead at the time of petition or at the time of conclusion.11 Id.
In an apparent reference to the present action, he noted that
[T]here is a determination by a Court in the State on a petition that the claim
survived the death of the petitioner. And again, that has been decided by
that judge and that's the way it is, but in future cases, is there a line that the
legislature wants to draw and say that these claims need to be brought to
someone's attention during the lifetime of the petitioner or not?
Id. He then provided an additional example, asking whether a convicted murderer
executed long ago would be entitled to a name-clearing proceeding-a far cryfromthe
present case. In a follow-up question, Representative Arent expressed confusion about
the purpose of including an effective date for any procedural changes applicable to filing
and adjudication of a petition. Mr. Reed pointed out that the statute had undergone a
prior amendment that carried language applying its provisions to "new petitions filed on
or after the effective date of this amendment." See Add. A at 5:128. Because that
language referred specifically to the old amendment, clarity demanded the new
amendments to specify their own effective date. To assure her understanding of that
point, Representative Arent again queried, "Would this [provision regarding the effective

6
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date of any procedural changes] have an impact on any pending Supreme Court cases,
cases that should be pending before the Utah Supreme Court?" Add. B at 5. To that
question, Mr. Reed answered, "No." Id. In other words, had the legislature opted to
curtail survivability of name-clearing proceedings, that procedural change would not
apply to cases currently pending before this Court. To suggest, as plaintiff does, that Mr.
Reed's response meant that no part of the amendments would apply to those pending
cases would rob Representative Arent1 s specific, focused query-" Would this [date]"
impact pending cases?-of its context and would violate the plain meaning of the
legislature's unambiguous declaration that the amendments clarify the statute. Mr. Reed's
comment was limited to assuring that plaintiffs case-and any others still pending after the
death of the petitioner-would go forward to conclusion. It did not agree that
clarifications of the substantive law would be irrelevant to the outcome.
In light of the certified transcript, plaintiff overreaches by suggesting that
Representative Litvak's concerns-and Mr. Reed's response to them-extend to both the
potential "extinguishing of a claim and right of recovery after the death of an innocent
convict despite the continuing concerns and needs of his family." Aplee. Brief at 9.
Representative Litvak carefully drew the distinction in his comments:
I can see where the State may have some concern that if someone who files
a claim passes away when it comes to the compensation that was really
meant, I think, for the individual who had served the time in prison, but I
can also say, thinking about it from the family perspective, that if this is my
relative who's claiming their innocence, it[']s going in the process, and then
they tragically pass away while it's in the middle of the process, for a family
7
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member there may be some reason why I would want to see at least whether
or not there was a determination on the factual innocence. And is there a
possibility to strike some distinction there?
Add. B at 4 (emphasis added). Representative Litvak's uncontradicted statement that
statutory compensation had always been understood as a remedy for only the individual
claiming factual innocence belies plaintiffs expansive interpretation.
Mr. Reed's observations also show that at the time of the House committee
hearing, the amendments were in an early draft, and the language had not crystallized into
its final form. In fact, the legislative intent was still being debated, as demonstrated by
Mr. Reed's question to the committee: ff[I]s there a line that the legislature wants to draw
and say that these claims need to be brought to someone's attention during the lifetime of
the petitioner or not?" Id. The preliminary nature of both the draft and the discussion at
that time demonstrate the folly of relying on legislative history instead of legislative
language as a definitive guide to interpretation of the amendments as finally enacted.
III. WITHOUT GIVING PRECLUSIVE EFFECT TO THE VACATUR
ACTION, THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO SUSTAIN THE
TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE
Plaintiff makes several additional arguments that the trial court's determination of
factual innocence can be sustained even without giving preclusive effect to the vacatur
action. None is well taken.

8
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A Neither the County Attorneys Motion to Vacate nor the State's Failure to
Appeal Establishes Plaintiffs Factual Innocence
First, plaintiff contends that factual innocence was established because the
prosecuting attorney was the moving party in the vacatur action, and the State did not
appeal from the vacatur decision. But the prosecuting attorney's "belief that this is not a
prosecutable case[,]" R. 393 at 15:26 - 16:1 (hearing), does nothing to establish plaintiffs
factual innocence; it shows only that the prosecutor believed the evidence of guilt was no
longer sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt-a conclusion
the State had no reason or obligation to second-guess. In effect, plaintiff asks the Court
to equate the terms "not guilty" and "innocent." Yet they are not synonymous. A person
who is "not guilty" of a crime may have, in fact, engaged in conduct that violates the law,
but cannot be held legally responsible for his behavior under the applicable burden of
proof. By contrast, a person who is "factually innocent" has not engaged in violative
conduct at all. As this Court has observed, "[t]he measure of certainty the law demands
before finding guilt reflects the balance we are willing to strike between insuring that all
of the guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment of the
innocent." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 11, 116 P.3d 305. The distinction between "not
guilty" and "innocent" is the very reason that vacatur and factual innocence are two
distinct causes of action governed by separate criteria. Once again, plaintiff erroneously
conflates those two independent standards.

9
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B. The Striking of the Victim's Affidavit in the State's Summary Judgment Motion
Does Not Establish Plaintiffs Factual Innocence
Next, plaintiff argues that "the State told the district court that it based its case and
summary judgment motion entirely on the affidavit of Corrie Robertson." Aplee. Brief at
15. In support, he points to the transcript of the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment. But plaintiff overstates the facts. The State's counsel argued that the
affidavit was "the basis of the State's motion for summary judgment," not the basis of the
entire case. R. 391 at 23:23-24. What evidence may have been produced in an
evidentiary hearing, had the trial court denied both parties' summary judgment motions, is
a matter of speculation. The State's counsel pointed out additional evidence that might be
provided in an evidentiary hearing:
[W]e call Mrs. Robertson to testify, and she testifies to exactly what's now
in her affidavit withfurther details. We put on the DNA report which the
Court already has before it, and there may be a police report or two from
1991 or whenever the date of this incident was, and we may or may not be
able to find any of the Juab County officers who were involved and medical
reports from that time.
R. 391 at 34:15-21 (emphasis added). Even plaintiffs attorney sought discovery while the
motions were pending decision, indicating his belief that additional evidence might be
adduced. SeeR. 391 at 38:4- 39:11.
Moreover, plaintiff misapprehends the purpose of summary judgment. Under Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
10
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as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
Nothing in the rule suggests that a party is limited to its basis for summary judgment in
pursuing further proceedings should the motion be denied. Summary judgment merely
functions to avoid protracted litigation in circumstances where the pleadings and other
papers demonstrate that further inquiry would not alter the grounds for decision. And
nothing in the rule alters the burden of proof in the underlying action. See Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 18, 177 P.3d 600. Despite the fact that the trial court struck the
affidavit on which the State's motion was based as inadmissible hearsay,2 plaintiff
retained the burden to prove the elements of his factual innocence claim: to show, by
newly discovered, clear and convincing evidence not known by him or his counsel at the
time of conviction or sentencing, that he did not engage in the conduct for which he was
convicted or relating to any lesser included offense, and that he did not commit any other
felony reasonably connected to the facts supporting the underlying information or
indictment. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-402(l) and (2) and 78B-9-404(l)(b) (West
2009 and Supp. 2011); 788-9-401.5(1) and (2) (West Supp. 2011).3 Plaintiff did not

2

Plaintiff notes that "[t]he State has not attacked that decision in its appeal brief
and may not do so now." Aplee. Brief at 15. The State agrees. However, it observes for
the Court's information that under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-404(2)(b) (West 2009 and
Supp. 2011), the trial court in a factual innocence action may consider "(b) hearsay
evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluating its weight and
credibility." That provision was not changed by the 2012 amendments.
3

These provisions are unchanged by the 2012 amendments.
11
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fulfill that burden. The entire argument in his motion for summary judgment comprised a
single paragraph that did not address the elements of a factual innocence claim:
Two DNA testing labs have produced test results strongly supporting
Gressmanfs steadfast assertion of innocence. The complaining witness's
story of what occurred has changed in material [but here unidentified]
respects since she first complained of being raped. Her story is suspect at
best. The District Attorney for Juab County concluded that post-conviction
evidence warranted dismissal of all charges against Gressman and his
release from prison. The Juab County District Court agreed and entered an
order of dismissal. Gressmanfs factual innocence is "the law of the case"
and should be followed by this Court. Justice has been delayed far too long
and should not be delayed further.
R. 170. Regardless of the fate of the State's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did
not carry his burden to affirmatively prove each element of his factual innocence claim,
and the trial court's grant of his motion was error.
C. The State Challenges Only Issues of Law and Therefore has No Obligation to
Marshal the Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
Plaintiff argues that the State has violated Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure by failing to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
"finding" of factual innocence. But he fails to recognize that, under the circumstances of
this case, the trial court's factual innocence determination is a conclusion of law, not a
finding of fact. Scrutiny of the trial court's opinion reveals that it made no findings of
fact-nor would findings have been appropriate in the context of ruling on the parties'
competing summary judgment motions, which are premised on the ground that no
genuine issues of material fact exist. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Tellingly, plaintiff

12
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identifies no specific finding of fact for which the State has failed to marshal the
supporting evidence.
Contrary to plaintiffs representation, the State's appeal challenges only legal
conclusions: (1) that the 1996 vacatur decision was res judicata on the issue of plaintiffs
factual innocence claim, (2) that plaintiffs widow was entitled to posthumous
compensation, and (3) that prejudgment interest was due on the award of posthumous
compensation. Because no finding of fact is at issue on appeal, the State is under no
marshaling burden.
D. The Sole Evidentiary Basis for the Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment
to Plaintiff was the Transcript of the Vacatur Hearing
Plaintiff contends that the evidence of his factual innocence is clear and
convincing. But the sole basis the trial court articulated for its grant of plaintiff s
summary judgment motion is the transcript of the vacatur hearing: "After reviewing the
transcript of the hearing in which Mr. Gressman's judgment was vacated, this Court
concludes that a determination of factual innocence was made at that time." R. 357. The
court neither identified the elements of a factual innocence claim nor attempted to show
how the vacatur court's findings filled those elements.
Ironically, plaintiffs argument is based in large part on the affidavit of plaintiff s
victim. See Aplee. Brief at 20-21. This argument cannot be credited because the
affidavit was-on plaintiff s motion-stricken from the record. Moreover, the argument
contains additional, opprobrious accusations of alleged conduct by the victim that are not
13
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supported by the record but for which plaintiffs counsel provides an inapposite record
citation to the vacatur court's findings of fact-falsely implying that they include findings
relating to intoxication, medical examination results, domestic violence, and a prior
accusation of rape. See Aplee. Brief at 20-21. No such findings were entered by the
vacatur court. Some-but not all-of those accusations do appear in less specific form in
County Attorney Leavitt's argument in the vacatur hearing when he recounted "a story
that Mr. Hancock arid Mr. Gressman have maintained from the beginning^],f R. 393 at
11:19-20, but Leavitt makes no reference to the latter two accusations. Those are found
only in the argument plaintiffs attorney made to the trial court without substantiation,
R. 391 at 26:25 - 27:4, and in Addendum C to plaintiffs response brief, a non-record
summary of unsubstantiated representations about plaintiff and his victim. Moreover, as
detailed in the State's principal brief, the alleged inconsistencies in the victim's testimony
regarding her pregnancy and changes in her recall of plaintiff s lastriairieand the
description of the vehicle used in the assault were known at the time of trial and
explained to the jury. See Aplt. Brief at 15-16. Therefore, they cannot constitute new
evidence for purposes of a factual innocence claim.
Plaintiffs evidence of factual innocence consists of nothing more than the vacatur
decision and additional unsupported accusations against the victim, at least one of which
(her alleged 1995 cohabitant abuse action) purportedly occurred well after plaintiffs 1993
crime and has no bearing on plaintiffs guilt or innocence. Contrary to plaintiffs
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argument, the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence of his asserted
factual innocence.
E. The Factual Innocence Statute Requires an Evidentiary Hearing if the State
Does Not Stipulate to a Petitioner's Factual Innocence
Plaintiff contends that the factual innocence statute does not require an evidentiary
hearing, either in its present form or before the 2012 amendments. He argues in a
footnote that such a requirement would violate the Utah Constitution's separation of
powers doctrine. The constitutionality of the statute has not been previously raised, and
nothing in the record addresses it. Moreover, a three-sentence footnote containing no
detailed analysis or discussion of relevant authority is inadequate briefing of the issue
under Utah R. 24(a)(9), as applied to appellees' briefs by subsection (b). The issue is
therefore not properly before the Court for decision. The State notes, however, that the
hearing requirement is a function of a court rule, Utah R. Civ. P. 65C, properly adopted
by this Court, and consequently does not present a separation of powers problem.
Plaintiff further contends that even if Rule 65C applies to factual innocence
claims, the rule's requirement for a hearing does not mandate an evidentiary hearing.
First, there can be no doubt that Rule 65C applies; the enrolled copy of H.B. 307
explicitly states that the bill "clarifies that all proceedings are governed by Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 65C[.]" Add. A at 1:16-17 (emphasis added). Second, the rule
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expressly contemplates an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. Under what
is now subsection (/) of the rule,4
After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a
hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a
prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(/)(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(/)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(/)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence
expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(Emphasis added.) In light of this language, it defies logic to suggest that the hearing
required by the factual innocence statute in the event of a contested petition is anything
short of an evidentiary proceeding. The fact that the trial court may dispose of the
petition on legal grounds-such as those presented in dispositive motions-does nothing to
change the requirement of an evidentiary hearing where the State does not stipulate to
factual innocence. Moreover, there would be no necessity to "identify witnesses and
documents" or "establish the admissibility of evidence" if an evidentiary hearing were not
required.
Nothing in plaintiffs argument overcomes the fact that the trial court's decision is
unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. The court placed exclusive reliance for its
determination on the vacatur of plaintiff s conviction. In doing so, it employed the

4

Current subsection (/) was designated as subsection (j) at the time plaintiff filed
his petition and became subsection (k) in 2010. The language of all three versions is
identical.
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doctrine of res judicata without affording the State an opportunity to address that theory.
It failed to address the elements of res judicata or to show how the vacatur decision
satisfied those elements. And it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing as the statute
mandates in the absence of a stipulation to factual innocence by the State. For these
reasons, the trial court's decision must be reversed.
IV. THE SURVIVAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR NAMECLEARING PURPOSES DOES NOT ENTITLE HIS WIDOW TO
STATUTORY COMPENSATION OR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
The State acknowledges that plaintiff s factual innocence claim survived his death
for name-clearing purposes.5 The statute now explicitly provides that "[a] claim for
determination of factual innocence under this part is not extinguished upon the death of
the petitioner." Add. A at 5:129-130. But just as the legislature provided for survival of
the statute's name-clearing function, it also provided that compensation does not survive:
"The assistance payment provisions of Section 78B-9-405 may not apply, and financial
payments may not be made, if the finding of factual innocence occurs after the death of
the petitioner. In addition, any payments already being made under Section 78B-9-405
shall cease upon the death of the petitioner." Add. A at 5:130-33. This language is
consistent with Representative Litvak's uncontradicted understanding, as expressed in the

5

The State objects to plaintiffs argument that "it is callous and unconvincing for
the State to suggest a convict's widow has no legitimate interest in following through with
the clearance of her husband's good name." Aplee. Brief at 29. The survival of plaintiff s
factual innocence claim for purposes of name-clearing has never been an issue on appeal.
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House committee hearing, that the statutory assistance payments had always been
intended only for the factually innocent person who had been wrongfully incarcerated.
See Point II, above.
Plaintiff suggests that posthumous compensation is protected by Utah's survival
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107. But Section 107 applies by its terms only to
personal injury and wrongful death actions: ffA cause of action arising out of personal
injury to a person, or death caused by the wrrongful act or negligence of another, does not
abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B~3-107(l)(a) (West 2009). Subsections (l)(b) and (c) reinforce the point.
Subsection (b) limits the survivors' recovery to general and special damages, and
subsection (c) further limits the recovery to only special damages if the party dies from
unrelated causes more than six months after the incident giving rise to the claim. Plaintiff
has provided no analysis of the survival statute or pertinent case law showing that a
factual innocence claim is a personal injury as contemplated by the statute or that
statutory assistance payments under the factual innocence statute are general or special
damages under the survival statute. His two-sentence argument is inadequate under Utah
R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) to warrant the Court's deliberation.
Plaintiffs resort to legislative history is equally unpersuasive. He quotes, without
proper citation, comments made by Senator Howard Stephenson in the floor debate on the
third reading of S.B. 16, the bill that originally enacted the factual innocence statute, in
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the 2008 general legislative session. He represents Senator Stephenson as holding the
"view that the government had a responsibility to make people whole for the 'awful
price paid by the person imprisoned and his or her family!" Aplee. Brief at 28. But
Senator Stephenson's remarks were not directed toward any question of extending
compensation to persons other than the one wrongly imprisoned. Instead, the senator
spoke in general support of the bill:
I rise in great support of this legislation, and appreciate Senator Bell's
leadership in helping to move this forward and all of those who have been
involved in this. I liken this to the amendments we have made recently in
the government immunity laws in Utah, which basically have protected
government from the liability for injuries caused to citizens. And we have
raised those limits, not to where they should be in my opinion, but we have
improved that, so that when government swings its fist and causes damage,
there is a responsibility on the part of government to, to some degree to
make people whole. I think we can only imagine what the horror must be to
be imprisoned wrongly and the, the awful price that is paid by the person
imprisoned and his or her family. And I think this legislation is long
overdue and I hope that everyone will support it.
Audio Floor Debate, 3dReading, S.B.16, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) at 11:43 - 13:06.
A simple recognition that wrongful imprisonment has an impact on the family of the
person incarcerated does not constitute an intent to compensate the family after the
person's death. Had the legislature intended compensation to survive the death of the
petitioner, it could have provided so explicitly-as it did in the workers' compensation
statute. See Aplt. Brief at 19-20. The legislature's initial choice not to provide for
posthumous compensation, coupled with the clarifying amendments expressly denying it,
indicate that statutory compensation was never intended to survive the petitioner's death.
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As to prejudgment interest, plaintiff claims the best evidence supporting the trial
court's decision is the decision itself. Aplee. Brief at 29. But the very inconsistency of
that decision with binding precedent triggers the need for this Court's review. While
plaintiff persists in asking the Court to treat the compensation payments fixed by the
statutory formula as tort damages based on actual harm, the statute is not susceptible to
his proposed interpretation. The statute does not contemplate individual circumstances of
factual innocence claimants in determining the amount of compensation due; rather, it
fixes a formula based on the number of years of wrongful incarceration (with a fifteenyear cap) times the most recently published average Utah nonagricultural payroll wage.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-405(l)(a) (West 2009 and Supp. 2011); Add. A at 7:184-90.
No demonstration of an individual's earning capacity or other unique circumstances vary
the amount of compensation available under the formula.
As the Court recognized in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway, 32 Utah 101, 88 P.
1003, 1006, such fixed statutory formulas for allowable damages are an exception to the
rule for determining damages in tort claims. Because the issue in Fell was whether a tort
claimant was entitled to prejudgment interest, the court proceeded to elaborate a test for
determining when, in tort cases, prejudgment interest should be allowed-a test that
depended on whether or not damages could be determined by resort to fixed rules of
evidence and known standards of value. Subsequent cases have, as plaintiff points out,
applied that test in the context of other tort and insurance claims, but plaintiff has

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

identified no case invalidating Fell's distinction of statutorily fixed damages as an
exception from prejudgment interest The continuing vitality of that distinction is
demonstrated by the court of appeals1 denial of prejudgment interest on a statutory award
of damages for a wrongful lis pendens in Winters v. Schulman, 2001 UT App 105, 2001
WL 357124. Although the court noted that the appellant in that case suffered no actual
damages and prejudgment interest was therefore unnecessary to provide full
compensation for his loss, it recognized, as an independent ground for its decision, that
the award, "which was a penaltyfixedby the statute, was clearly distinguished by the Fell
court as a damage award for which prejudgment interest is not allowable." 2001 UT App
105 at *1. The fact that Winters is an unpublished opinion does not vitiate its authority.
Rule 30(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "unpublished decisions
of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1, 1998, may be cited as precedent in
all courts of the State."
Plaintiffs arguments for posthumous compensation and prejudgment interest lack
any basis in the statutory text and the amendments clarifying it. At most, plaintiff
disagrees with the policy chosen by the legislature. But that disagreement, however
heartfelt, cannot overcome the legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the
statute.
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V. PLAINTIFF HAS ASKED FOR NEITHER SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF HIS APPEAL NOR SANCTIONS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL
Plaintiff asserts that the Court should summarily affirm the trial court's order
because ff[t]he decision in this case will have no precedential value." Aplee. Brief at 35.
Plaintiff fundamentally misapprehends the function of the Court's decisions by suggesting
that the Court can simply ignore error by the trial court. Regardless of whether statutory
changes may limit the reach of the Court's decision on some issues, the trial court's
misapplication of the principles that govern factual innocence claims cannot go
unaddressed. The question of whether vacatur of a conviction conclusively establishes
factual innocence is one the amendments do not resolve. Even if the Court holds the trial
court's application of res judicata erroneous, any remand for additional proceedings rnay
still raise issues of posthumous compensation and prejudgment interest. Moreover, there
may be other cases begun under the pre-amendment statute that involve the sariie issues.
Finally, although he could have moved for summary disposition under Rule 10 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, plaintiff failed to do so. And even if he had, he
cannot show, as the rule requires, that the appeal raises no substantial questions.
Plaintiff gratuitously includes, as an addendum to his brief, correspondence
between the parties regarding his threat to seek sanctions against the State's counsel under
Rule 11(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But following the State's response to
him, plaintiff did not file his motion in this Court. Consequently, the State does not deem
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it appropriate to counter plaintiffs accusations here. However, the State invites the Court
to peruse its response to plaintiffs attorney contained in Addendum G to plaintiffs brief.
In addition, plaintiff has based his argument for sanctions against the State in part
on the two-page "Chronology of Delay" appended to his brief as Addendum F. See
Aplee. Brief at 37. The State objects to this non-record addendum as unrelated to the
articulated basis for plaintiffs unfiled motion for sanctions. Moreover, the majority of the
alleged delays took place before the State's current appellate counsel, who entered her
appearance on February 9, 2012, was involved in this case.
Neither the unfiled motion for sanctions nor the ''Chronology of Delay'' pertains to
the merits of the appeal. They appear to be included in plaintiff s brief only to inflame the
Court and should be disregarded for that reason.
CONCLUSION
The sole basis for the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff is factually innocent is
the prior vacatur of his conviction. Because factual innocence comprises different
elements and was not a claim available at the time of the vacatur proceedings, the trial
court's application of res judicata was error. Even if it were not, the plain language of the
statute cannot support the award of posthumous compensation and prejudgment interest
to plaintiffs widow. For these reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to
reverse the decision of the trial court.
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Dated this

day of August, 2012.

Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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hearing regarding the petition.
{11) \ pennon u artermine factual innocence under this part, or Part 3, Posicoir ctn-n
1 •'• 'ng oi DN A -.i,; * ix; nied sepaiateh \um> an\ p> tin, .. :,:
i *ieil Pi> \ i .iui-.

, ;>

k i..... Lii.:i a i ;

lepaiat* per i^n* m ^ K" *lf •.! ^nniilf: I.MII h -n the Mink a «:

"h ;M.*«V IWK IN - n . ,r tin * i :- aih adjudication oi a petition to determine
<*. .ai innocence apph IO all petitions curremh filed or pending in the district court and any
lev petitions filed nn <•; alu-r IthctfTcclivcTfatt^

June 1, 2012.

(14) A claim for determination of factual innocence under this part is not extinguished
upon the death of the petitioner. The assistance payment provisions of Section 78B-9-405 may
not apply, and financial payments may not be made, if the finding of factual innocence occurs
afUM

JR

' ceath ol die petitioner. In addition, any payments already being made under Section

'Mi 9-405 shall cease upon the death of the petitioner.
Sectir . "* S.viM*n "*!*.<) io j is amended to read:
78B-9-404. Hearin

*-; -

letition

Procedures -- Court determination of factual

innocence.
(., va- In >ri; hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall
represent the ^an\
(r

rif; :'uiik-n

t,

i •

lilioiin I i ,".lalilisli flic prhlmi ,i

ki< lu ii iniitknu
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Enrom
u i 'I he I'ourt may consider:

.

(j; e\ idence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and
(b) hears a \ e\ idence, ami may consider that the evidence is hearsay in ei 'aluati rig its
III

J i » d I.

I
n

;

. .:'

.

h- m.iK .: t o. ei i !< ; * , UK •„ t. , *;. ai ^.j.-.id . ,.. .,: .. i. ,. .». u.^ c \ . . > n ' ^

r ^ e n t e d at the hearing under thus part, the iccord 01 ihc original cnmmal case and al ^-n
• ^conviction proceedings m the * ase
( ' • Is in, i i\,r

wiu-i cen-adering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing

ewuence that the petitioner
( . r .n".iM;i\ iiim.. eiu oi one or moie olfenses ol vvlm lli Ihe petitinuei was i, onvieled,
•fia* -r i- . :• ( " ! ii-e • *>n*. -.'i-ms: .
\

(

•*'

.1

.ti-

,

>

'!•

:•:

;.-ti

.

; i d

. • • " • •

.

-."•

.
"•" . '

.

';.

h* expunged Jrom the petitioner'^ record' or

(b) did not commit -ru -.•• :« ?!•. t»!ic:iM.i.ol A'lueh the petitioner was convicted I . t t i e
eonr does not find by clear and convincing i udencc tluu the petui»mci did not commit any
le-wi included offenses relaiing in those offenses, the court shaP modify the original
onviction ano M ntena ol J-'IC p'.-tmon-T a- . ;•] '••j>ii.iiu lit :Au iessci iiKKuh . "ip-n

•* -%\b x

he jester th i-id-'d <>***MIM* U T , onnin.-'^- -.M!VMIU^! !o *! • :• :-T <:f fa.
^ui
<

I' ;.

< '•,.:1 .ntcr i onsklennj! .:i; Mx: K \ uh nee, does not determine by clear and

neini! evidence thai UK* peniionei is factually innocent ol the offense or offenses the

petitioner -.s challenging ami does not find that Subsection (4)(b) applies,'the court shall deny
•h. ;>etiti< n reizardim:; the offense or offenses,
( j , li die conrt IHKL thai Uie petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding
>• ne record, and the petitioner ma\ not file a second or successive petition unuei \U: -x h v. - » ? • .3

(* A -

:* ;.ri nission fi oi n the eon u: t: "w 'hich •i-"1*iJ

lU> ,n

-*

Jays pno; iw 4t wearing on a pt nouh u, *K ieimiik 1 actual innocence, the

petitioner and the respondent shall exchange information regarding the evidence each intends
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.-i..^ informntion shall include:

*T- a list ol witnesses to be called at the hearing; a n d
(b) a summary of the testimony or other evidence to b e introduced through each
i ^

witness, including any expert witnesses.
' ' •

(7) Each-party is entitled to a copy of any expert, i eport to b e inti oduced or relied upon

lb;; that "'expert 01 another expert at least 30 days prior to hearing,

. '

•.-••'.'

(8) The, court, after considering, all the evidence, may not find the petitioner to b e
factually innocent unless:
(a) the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not
1''K

c o m m i t one or more of the offenses of which the petitioner was convicted,.as defined n

) ?9

Subsection 78B~9-40L5(2)i and

' <">''
l<

V•

U;c

determination, is based, upon.ti

- • jc petition, pursuant to Section 7 8 B - 9 - 4 0 2 , and as defined in Subsection 78B-9.-401.5*'3).

IK

Section 3 Section "8lt- 4 )-40^ is a m e n d e d u read;

I!

78B-9-405.

1K i

C * (V If a court finus a pelinoner factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapttr-9: Part

18

\. r e c o n v i c t i o n Testing oi D N A , or undei iliih p a u , and if the p e h u o n e r has served a :><- •-<!

I8i

<; mcarccration, the court shall o n l c 'hat. as provided in Subsection u » , ihc p e t i t i o n s .: ..

IS

-i\ i <* c tor each cu, ,.,,.. . ;.. - < . , . . . . . ; . * . , . . -•

IS
IS1
1<HI

:eni and assistant payment.

, in* u r e n t c d n- ' i M i n a x p .'

'ie ;^iKfctar\ -v?r' a) • ' • • ' ^ a \ e r a g e annual nonagrieuitunu p a u o l ] wage iu \ a;-

\
i

-

K r.nmed b y the data m o s t recemi> p n b h - h c d l " the Department >i Woikforcc Scrvi. *-s dt

the time of the petitioner's release from prison.

lvM

(K A- u- *-i '( hi-H Subsection ( I ) . "| ^ m o n c t " m e a n s a United States citizen or an

19 \

indn idua: wh. u *, Mh**rw'i^c law hilly p i e s c , ^ ;n ilu^ country at the time of the incident that

191!

gave rise to the u n d c r h m g ^onvMiiJii

l(M

(? Payment ^ nuisu.: H i< 11 a - - ;ccin* : . I...J. . - m a d e as follows:

l^i

0

ic'h

'

11K

v ;,L; J I : - . V - C *vi--i-. !r . MJ (' 'ni • sh ill pay from the Ci ime

.. Kc^ar.hons

• !*• • pe ?h:.: - v Mln: l-- iiau oi the court order under Subsection (1) an initial sum
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I
equal to either 20% * T the Urial financial assis'anee payment as Jctcrntiru;*! mdei Suhv =st >;,
I >i an amount equal i- u-

yeais ot incarceration., A !..:, never is greater, but not to exceed the

„ouu amount owed.

*

(b) The I .ejuslature shall appropriate as nonlapsing funds ft om the General Fun i , and
- 1 general session following the issuance of the' cot n 1: order under

1 A) *
):

(t u • ' he Crime Victim Reparations Fund, the amount that was paid out of the fund
• • 1 u Subsection (?.)ia); and
(ii) t<* the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, as a .separate line item, vc
tm- -unt ordered by the court for payments urtiei Subsection < I • minus the amount reimbursed

\- incut. i' the peliM >:ie '-n vr

!i

. v " ..r. • the. • •? : • payment

.'UuMliMa; shall he made in ;* • ommi.vsion on * unr. ai and Juvenile Jusiiu wu. ieriy
nefore t!ie ia.st da\ oi the momh next sin tecdiiijj each calendar quarterh period
(d) Payments undei Subsection (2){L I shall
(i - commence no later than one year alter the effective dale jf the appropriation !•_: tii3
mi<-

*iai pa' '-i

* : .1«i* Snhseetir.*- \ *)':.- •

(iii) h ,i moated so that tin entire am* m.; due to the pdUiowei undei ihis section has
been paid no late1 than 10 years aim the effective date of the appropriation made under
Sunsection (?Kb

-

(A - (a- Payments pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent that th/ -v ^A
of incarceration for which the petitioner seeks payment was attributable to a separate and
lawful convict v
0

i

;,

: % A** .-A

••; AKA- ^AAA-A

>u

A^v

i.,i-

'

•

-i.

»C:K

en:.*

ine pcntionei - -m^eq <e;i; v OIIVK tioi ^ * iei-'«n\ aii.l sn ='

resume u\ on ;*ie conclusior oi that period of incarceration.
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(ii) As used in this section., "felony" means a criminal offense classified as a felony

?.2h

under Title 76, Chapter 3, Punishments, or conduct that would constitute a felony if committed

-•'?

-i-_:.Ji.

\1>:

(c. The reduction of payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) oi the tolling of payments
.<

1 li l

'

UL '•• Sub^coiiu;; . -,; 1 > » si r< ii! l »< * deter mined by the same coui t-that finds a petitioner to be

'ac:-- ill- :*.i< .• * \I\K\CA ' T-iwc -7-Hj, Chapter 9,] Par I: 3, Postconv iction resting of DNA, or this

232

' (4) (a) A person is ineligible for any payments under this part if the person was already

23

.er\ tug a prison sentence in another jurisdictn n at lb* lime <\\\\w conviuion oi the crm.** u

234

whn n thai person has been sound I actually innocent pursuan; :•• i -ftthr78D. Chapter V:' Is i J,

"*V

I'osi • eviction Testing oi I >NA o n h i s part. »;ioMh«tinerson s:

'l
%

h icnirneu to thai -s;

(i' In- ii,MtVi:\ lor an\ pa\ments pin - u:M i- Mu Mihv , ..*
5>'-

239

* -:s.. .:edetetiftiri^by' ••

the same court thai IIIRK a person to he iaclua I mnocent undcj 1 : fttkr-7tifl7^hapter 9,][ Part 3 ,
Postconviction Testing of DNA oiiiw^pai;

"4;:

•

(5, Paymcul-;Hi-Ui si ^ ;m<* section

:l4

(a) are not subject to an) I Han stale taxes; and

?A '

(b iu. • i : be offset bv M\ expenses incurred by the state or any political subdi\ ! a o r

'.*<*

i

'.4-

T

i i ^ a k \ n . J . ,a, ^\[;e;. >e.-> m i n t e d :*- *•.<* .

74^
?4*

••. " V i

'- '

*'*••!

J

K* medic d ^M* KV-> fo tin pe'r.-oiK >
(e il . u:.n -iiids ;; pcutionrj to be ;iuctuali> innocent nnde* . i (tic- rHiir^trapterS^]

P a ^ ^. Postconviction Testing of i ).\ A. or this part, the court shall also:
(a* issue <m t>rd**r ol expungement oi the pctraonn' 4 - criminal record I'm all acts in the

247
248

'•

i liaising document upon winch the pajment .rwi.-; i! is pait is • ,iseu and

249

(1 piovidc a letter to the petitioner explaining that the petitioner's conviction has been

250

WK J i*d or. the groun-is-e u, n u ; inno-zencr ;u.d mdi' ating Uir, Mcpeu.io;. : ,,:....:;.. n ..

251

ti-i

75

. in

-M' -s t nirs l<v u :i;. • JK* |x»0!nMic: v " -"" '^'ed and "' a^ ! :t<" fo»n4 * *--- be facM: M\
:!! , 'nit ! irtir ~JMh- <-traptrrv i Pan • - >stconviction i cMm^ ol DNA. or tins |Mr
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>s

< .

*SS
*v
.-*>
!1 V '
i^

•

(7) A petitioner found to be factually innocent under [Tithr?8fi7€hatjptcr9: ] Par ;•,
PONK

onviction Testing of DNA, or this part shall have access to the same services and

programs avanahic i^ \ ":*ah • ;ti/,ms i»eneralK .-.s though Uie conviction for which the petitioner
*

•>*•

'i . . . , i.

, -^ , .s. h.td n e w . * * . u a ^

P. * • . - ; • • . M :h* nart con .:•<••:!

!s 1 and • :onclusi * e i esolution • Df the

peii!i..ik*i sclainiM)ii tlk spi-cilu issue ot iaauai innocence, Pre-judgment interest may.not b e
u:i] I.I addition to the payments provided under this part.
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House Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice Committee— Hearing February 3f 2012: http://le.utah.Rov
Representative O d a :

February 3,2012. We have some minutes we need to approve from January

31stso I need a Motion.

Representative Frank moved to approve the minutes of the January 31, 2012 meeting
Representative O d a : Item No. 1 on the agenda - House Bill 307 Factual Innocence Amendments Representative Dee. Floor is yours Representative and Mr. Majority Leader.
Representative Dee: Let's get that mic up there - whoa, there we go. Yeah that's miced up. I was
fishing for my glasses - my reading glasses ~ a few minutes ago and they weren't in the case. So I turned
to Representative Brad Galvez who was a part of the Brad Caucus and I said "if I can't find my glasses
and I told him I couldn't find my glasses - he said he'd cover for me. So, without the glasses he'd be
sittinghererunning the bill. No actually, I found them. Thank you. . . . .
Representatives, the factual innocence amendments-someofyou have a history with this as I do, the
factual innocence statute was enacted In.2008/ amended in 2010. I voted for that bill and I'm proud to
say I did. It was a great bill and before I get really into the litany of what this particular bill does, let me
just make this statement clear to this committee - no one that is innocent of a charge should serve time
in jail and if we can find by evidence that is la
innocent/ we have a responsibility - n o t only an obligation - but a responsibility to correct that error.
And thatfs what the bill in 20Q8 and 2010 has done. There have been people that have benefitted from
that legislation and rightly so. This particuJar bill, as we look at what this does is it tightens a little thing
up and I am goingXo make it very, veiysimpleand then Tm going to ask the Attorney Genera
maybe to speak to it and then we'll have a bit more c o n v e r t
But what this particuliar bill does is it allows the judicial proceeding to take place, but it must address
new evidence. So> .tint; to make it in very simple terms, I don't think it's right that we should say we
want to second guess a jury that made a decision several years ago or a particular judge that might have
made a decision several years ago based on thefactsofthesituationof a case that was before them at
that time. I also don't want to go back and guess-second guess- prosecuting attorneys or what they
could or could not have done or, in fact, what they should or should not have done, or defense
attorneys in the same theme. I'm willing to look at additional evidence that proves innocenee. As I said,
I think that's our responsibility and our vocation. But to go back and look at a case and say that a
prosecutor should have done something different or a defense attorney should have done a different
defense style or a different point of their defense, I've worked with a lot of defense attorneys and I
understand that sometimes they weigh the evidence and they decide- I'm going to use this goal or
procedure and I'm going to not go this particular direction.- I don't think it's a good thing for us to
come back years later and try to decide whether that was intentional or not and whether it was good
or not and ask a judge many years later, without witnesses in front of him, without evidence in front of
him or her, and ask him to make a decision of the determination on evidence that was presented at trial
Unless, you can show me that there is new evidence that was not presented at trial and should be
considered now. That's the intent of the legislation. One more thing I want to say before anybody gets

1
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worried about this - this does not reach back. I have had those discussions with the attorney general's
office, in fact today, we have had additional discussions and they have assured me again that this
does not reach back. If there are cases that have been preexisting before this particular legislation
goes into effect, they stand - becausethat was the adjudication that was made with the facts and
evidence at that particular time. This is not an attempt to reach back. This is not retroactive on any
case that may be out there. {00:4:56-00:5:25) This is something that we look at and a standard we set
in moving forward from this particular time. With that I'd like to give some time to the Attorney
General's Office Scott Reed.
Representative Oda:

Make sure to state your name and who you are with.

Assistant Attorney General Scott Reed: Yes, Scott Reed from the Attorney GeneraI's Office. I'm the
division chief, the Criminal Justice Division. Members of the Committee, I appreciate the time, I don't
wantto take up alot and waitfor your questions, but when this law was first enacted four years ago it
kindof came to my division in the form of other duties as assigned. Since that time our office has
fielded roughly twelve or more of these petitions in the course of theJasf four years. We see a kind of ;
longitudal aspect of this. I want to represent to the Committee that from examination of this bill, you
understand that thisfehot ah ove
pouple of minor phrases. So, really what we w^
e0JLif)Ie of other urtfqreseen consequen
to any questions you have.
Representative Oda:

Okay. Are there any questions from Cdmmittee Members?

Litvack.

Representative

•.'• - .'-".

'"'•'• '••••:[•;;

•

Representative Litvack: Thank you Mr. Chair. I do have a few questions. First of all, I wantto thank
both Representative EJee and the AG's office for the time they have spent with me going through the bill; •
and making sure iunderstpod jt from their prospective. When we talk about-and I will say that
Representative Dee very accurately describes the intent of the original legislation in terms of the fbcius
on newly discovered evidence. I think that from a lay person's mind when I read this it is pretty clear
with that intent. But I do have a question because sometimes
legislation -1 think- recognized some of that. But, where do we draw the line between rehashing when
something is~when an old case or old evidence is being rehashed versus where in current statute it
allows? I'm looking at my-starting on lines 38, the petitioning- where the petition is based on new
evidence coming forward and the judge is going to make a determination of whether that petition is
valid or not based on that newly discovered material evidence? But then the current statute also allows
that new evidence to be viewed in light of all of the other evidence of that case. So, it is within the
judges authority-1 spoke the right word - or purview to look at the entire case once that new evidence
has been submitted and that's affirmed in line 46 where it says "viewed with all the other evidence."
So, I'm assuming all the other evidence they are talking about - that the evidence from the case, 15,25
years ago. That is also reaffirmed on lines 163 and even the new language where you say "the Court
after considering all the evidence." So how do we-there seems to be a fuzzy line there. Howdo we .
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determine when we are rehashing old evidence and when we are just incorporating that old evidence as
a part of the discussion of newly discovered evidence?
Scott Reed: That, Representatives is an excellent question. I think the ultimate objective of this
statute, and if it were the perfect mousetrap, would be to screen out every frivolous or meritless claim
that may come along, at the same time allowing every meritorious claim to be heard by a judge. And
that is our objective. How we get there it may take some time. To address your question sir, I think
that it's a matter of degree and weight at some point and I think when we envision the easy question in
a factual innocence case it's when a petitioner has something conclusive, like DNA evidence where we
can all agree, that decides the issue. Unfortunately/there are not going-every one of these cases is not
going to be based upon DNA and especially, I think, in older cases where the technology really wasn't
available at the time. There may be some opportunity for that retesting nowadays and we have a
mechanism for that in a separate portion of the statute. When you get to the question of factual
innocence that's determined by evidence that's not scientifically conclusive, then I think we have the
difficulty that you recognize in weighing what was known then against what is known now and seeing
how it all meshes together into this ultimate conclusion that the person is not responsible for the crime.
Representative Litvack: So, it is fair to say that even with the clarifying language in here trying to
highlight-1 think it's important to say that focusing on new evidence is not new, and again, that vvas the
original intent of the initial legislation. By highlighting newly discovered evidence oh those effect lines
163 through 170, is it fair to say then that, particularly in cases where there's not DNA evidence,^

^

understand tends to be the majority cases, will never have - there is no way to clearly or fix this* 1 m£an
clearly fix this to the point where there's always going to be somesortof exchange therein terms o ^
weighing when a judge may be overstepping their boundsin terms of rehashing a case versus properi^
finding that balance? Isn't the system - and therefore isn't this bill so that it protects the interests of
•both potentialinnocence as wellas the interest of the State in the "original convictions and
by allowing the AG:••-'the Attorney General's office to in essence say yes we agree with the Judge's
determination ofthe petition and that this person is factually innocent and stipulate to that or if vve
don't then we go to a hearing and at that point the petitioner has to show that clear and convincing?
evidence. So, isn't that the real safeguard there?''
Scott Reed:

Yeah, and it works both ways. I agree With Representative Dee and yourself. This is a

mechanism in criminal justice that is absolutely essential. We have to have this safety net for the y
innocent. However, there are those who are not by definition innocent who want to take advantage of
the opportunity to do this and you have to have some gatekeeper function built into the system and
then newly discovered evidence provision in part serves that purpose. It also provides the petitioner
with the basis to come in and get the recognition of the Court and say "look, this was not known to
anyone until now, at least in a court of law and it's compelling and you've gotta take 3 look at this
because this is upon - you know, this is the basis for my claim." So, again we are trying to build the
mouse trap that weeds out the bad claims and allows the good claims to go through to conclusion.
Representative Litvack: Mr. Chairman I have one additional question, but a quick comment. I guess
there will always be some win over. I mean, minus DNA evidence, there have to be a process. Do we
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have to have some level of trust in the process and what you're trying to do from your prospective is,
from your prospective get a little more trust in the process for the County attorneys, for the AG's office,
Scott Reed: And for the judges who have to make the last ultimate decision and not feel like they're in
the untenable position of having to second guess a jury.
Representative Litvack: One last question Mr Chair. Lines 120 - the, if in essence someone who has
filed a claim of factual innocence passes away that extinguishes the claim or the claim would go away.
Can you explain the rationale behind that, whether or not that's based on a court case and one thought
that I have, is it possible, I can see where the State may have some concern that if someone who files a
claim passes away when it comes to the compensation that was really meant,! think, for tfie individual
who had served the time in prison, but I can also say, thinking about it from the family perspective, that
if this is my relative who's claiming their innocence, its going in the process, and then they tragically pass
away while It's in the middle of the process, for a family member there may be some reason why I would
want to see at least whether or not there was a determination on the factual innocence. And is there a
possibility to strike some distinction there?
Scott Reed:

Well again I guess without some kind of bright line, you run the risk that claims from times

gone by are going to surface and become permissible, simply because there hasn't been a clear
statement of public policy with regard to whether or not petitioner must be alive or dead at the time of
petition or at the time of conclusion. In the particular case, there is a determination by a Court in the
State on a petition that the claim survived the death of the petitioner. And again, that has been decided
by that judge and that's the way it is, but in future cases, is there a line that the legislature wants to
draw and say that these claims need to be brought to someone's attention during the lifetime of the
petitioner or not? My imperfect example would be Joe Hill, I mean you read in the paper here lately
that Joe Hill may or may not have committed the murder for which he was prosecuted and executed
and although there may not be a whole lot of evidence or new evidence in that case, it is certainly a
legitimate concern and is that going to promulgate yet another claim that we need to litigate?
Representative Litvack: Mr. Chair, thank you for the indulgence of the committee.
Representative Oda:

Thank you Representative Litvack. Representative Arent.

Representative Arent: Thank you. Some of my questions have been asked but I am curious about the
date on line 119 and the significance of that date.
Scott Reed: When the statute was last amended was two years ago and the language of the bill as I
recall was that and because it was effective upon signing, the language of that particular bill in 2010
contained the language "after the effective date of this amendment." Leg counsel noticed that that's
no longer tenable language in the statute and so I think made the appropriate choice to designate the .
time when that occurred which was the signing date for the governor of that particular bill. What it's
created is an impression that somehow we are trying to take the whole thing arid move back two years,
which is not I don't think anybody's intention here. So that -I think we're going to be in discussions
about maybe adjusting that so that it doesn't make it appear or doesn't confuse the issue of
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retroactivity or how much of this is being dragged back two years in order to do over that whole
process. That's not our intent.
Representative Arent: Would this have an impact on any pending Supreme Court cases, cases that
should be pending before the Utah Supreme Court?

Scott Reed: No. (17:23)
Representative Oda: Any other questions or comments from Committee? Saying none: Did you have
anything Representative Dee?
Representative Dee; No, well, okay. I shouldn't say no. and then keep talking. To address the
Representative's concern and I have committed that that date we are going to be working on that date.
In fact I've committed to several people that we are going to be working that date. As I stated first, we
are not reaching back on any case. (18:02)
Representative Oda:

Seeing no further lights. We're going to take this to the audience. Is there

anyone in the audience who would care to spe^k to this? Come on up. Whenyouget to the micpleasei
state your name and who you represent if you rep

any organization and before leavfcv

make sure you sign the sign up sheetthere.
Daniel Medwed:

Thank you Representative Oda; IVly name isDanielMedwed. I'm a Professor^

at the University of Utah at J. Quinney College of Law. I'm a t o W ^
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center, 1 will lie speaking on behalf of the Rocky Mountain Innocence
Center today not the University of Utah,

;

We are a bit concerned about t h ^
on future cases. We have tremendous respect for Re
that there is no intent for this, fqrthese proposed Amendments to reach back and so weare very
heartened about the idea of working with the Attorney General's Office in the coming weeks to change
that language. The so called retroactivity issue to get to a point where evei7one's very comfortably with
that. But as I did say, we are somewhat concerned about the potential impact on future cases>
specifically on the following issue. This legislation was passed in 2008 aft

one year working group

process composed of a bipartisan group of prosecutors and defense lawyers and academics and other
people and we believe that the statute, as it currently stands, truly reflects the intent of the legislature,
which was to provide a fair and appropriate recourse for potentially innocent criminal defendants to
prove their innocence in court. Newly discovered evidence is the typical way in which one can prove
innocence. However, sometimes evidence might not reach the very high rigid standard of newly
discovered evidence. So with that in mind, the original statute included a provision that said that if the
evidence could not, could have been discovered with reasonable diligence by the attorney earlier inthe
process and it was not discovered, maybe by an oversight or maybe just bad luck, then a court in the
interest of justice could still consider that evidence even though it-might not technically rise to the level
of newly discovered evidence. The idea is if s not old evidence either. A jury never heard that evidence.
So we're concerned that the proposed amendment could remove that interest of justice language and
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suggest that a judge in his or her discretion could not even consider evidence that has been newly
presented to the court because technically it does to rise to the level of newly discovered evidence. So
we have just received this proposed amendment and we're looking forward to working with the
Attorney General's office and Representative Dee to work through some of these issues In the coming
weeks. We were hopeful maybe that it could be set aside until later in the session as we begin to work
through that process. If there are any questions I would be more than happy to answer them or try too.
Representative Oda:

Representative Seelig.

Representative Seelig:

Thank you sir. Thank you for coming here today and thanks to the sponsor for

bringing the bill forward. I have a question. Is there
Representative Oda:

Wbuldyou bring the mike down a little bit?

Representative Seelig:

Is this better? (faughter) You're going to deserve this one then. You know

one of my favorite things about sen/ingin this legislature with many of my colleagues is how concerned
we are when governmental systems do unjust things to members of the public. That is one of the
beautiful things about being here in Utah, So, I would like to know if this type of statute is rated or if
there is a national comparison or some type of benchmark measure that articulates where we fall as
Utahns in a continuum of protecting the rights of the innocent? Does anything like that exist and if so,
how do bur current statutes rate and where do these potential changes take at?
Professor Medwed: Thank you; Ibelieve Utah-rates very high on the list of states. Again, when you
passed this legislation in 2006,1 trotted
justice balancing the interest of fairness against finality, innocence against guilt W^
change Representative Seligis that itrnightfae a little step back, maybe more than a little step back.
That's why we want some timet:o explore the potential ramifications on future cases. If i may, if 1 could
give a brief hypothetical to illustrate a potential probliem. Let's say there is a murder case and
somebody^s convicted. Years later a person comes out of the woodwork to confess to the crime. That
person was unknown to any lawyers, the police or anybody atthe time of trial. That would be newly
discovered evidence and that would be an appropriate basis for filing a petition and presenting evidence
in court. Let's say —let's change the facts. Let's say in that same murder case this person who years
later confessed was just mentioned In a police report as a potential person of interest. Defense lawyers
say that name, sent a private investigator to the address, couldn't find the person, never tracked the
person down and that information was never presented to a jury at trial. Years later that suspect
confesses to a crime. We are concerned that these amendments would prevent a court from
considering that evidence because that evidence might not technically be considered newly discovered
evidence because possibly it could be argued, and may be argued by the Attorney General's Office or,
interpreted by a court, that that evidence should have been found through the exercise of reasonable
diligence before therefore i f snot truly hew

under these amendments a court might..hot even

allowed to entertain that evidence. In oufview, that would not be consistent with the thrust and the
intent of this legislation was to prepare or offer and appropriate remedy for the truly factually innocent
Thankyou.
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Representative Litvack:

Thank you Mr. Chair. Most of my question was answered, I just wanted to -

the interest of justice that you're talking about is in lines 53 through 65, is that correct?
Professor Medwed: That's correct.
Representative Litvack: Can you explain, I guess, how or why you feel - so that's not being changed,
that's staying in the bill?
Professor Medwed: Yes.
Representative Litvack: So, can you explain for us how you feel that could be compromised with some
of the changes that are being made.
Professor Medwed: Yes, thank you. Here's why. Those lines Representative Litvack relate to the
petition, what may be included in the petition that a petitioner will, may file under the statute. The
changes which are, are you noted, lines 163 to 170, relate to the evidence that a judge may - must
consider in rendering a decision aftera hearing. Those changes, the proposed changes, do hot refer
back to the interest of justicie language'. Instead those changes only refer to the previous language that
relates to newly discovered material evidence. So, our concern is that whereas a petitioner may be able
to refer to evidence that could have'been discovered through the exercise of due diligence ^reason
diligence at the time of tral in thepeti
evidence in rendering a filial decision.
Representative Arent;

Thank you. 1 would H

opinion on two o f the changes. The first one being on line 120 that we have discussed earlier about the
claim being extinguished upon the death of the petitioner and the second being the very fast line of the
bill about prejudgment inter^t

;

^

Professor Medwed: Thank you. With respect to the change on lines 120

to

survivorship

• change/it is our position that a person prlhe estate ofa person should be allowedto pursue a factual
innocence claim; if only to clear the name of the deceased. That is our position. The idea i$ that
someone who has died and is deprived of the opportunity to prove his or her innocence should not.
necessarily be foreclosed through his or her survivors from having a clear name, if in fact the evidence
supports it. That is purposition.

With respect to the prejudgment interest, we would prefer to some

extent that prejudgment interest could be included but we are not as insistent on that. In part because
we recognize that this legislation is quite generous and quiet fair. Again, going through Representative
Seelig's point on where Utah falls on the spectrum of states, we rate very high on that list in terms of
providing recourse for innocent defendants. So that's a proposal that we are mildly concerned about
but not as concerned about as we are with others.
Representative Oda: Thank you. Representative Butterfield.

.

Representative Butterfield: Trying to weigh the - as Representative Seeiig mentions the sensitivity we
want to have to citizens when we lock them up and be able prove their innocence. At what point
though, I mean at some point we have to say we can't clog up the resources by continually going after
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"well you know, this wasn't done to my liking*, or I'm not a legal scholar and I hope my way of approach
to this, if you can bear with me, at what point do we say, you know, we can't entertain every reach
back, well this wasn't done correctly or, in my estimation, how much of that can we afford in the
system?
Professor Medwed: That is an excellent question and I agree with the thrust of it which is at some
point there has to be finality for victims, for all of the participants in the criminal justice system. It's our
position that there should be finality including finality for the fact
provided an opportunity, a final opportunity to clear their name. We believe that this legislation is the
perfect balance, an excellent balance between fairness and finality. None of the proposed changes in
my view necessarily prevent people from filing petitions. I'm not sure whether these proposed
amendments are going to decrease the number of filings. Again, our major concern is the effect of
these proposed amendments on what may be considered in the final determination of innocence. And
it's our position that the bar should be very high. If you're going to prove your innocence you should
meet a high bar. A jury has found you guilty, the appellate court has affirmed that decision, and the bar
necessarily should be very high and we believe the bar as it stands is apt. The changes might raise it too
t»igh.
Representative Butterfield: Mr; Chair if f may. Could you elaborate on that bar for me a little bit?
What-elaborate on the high standard that has
witness thatmay not be newevidence butit might be considered what?
Professor Medwed:

Newly presented evidence.

Representative Butterfield; Newly presented evidence. Elaborate on that bar for me if you will.
Professor Medwed:

Sure. The vvay the statute currently operates there is bar that says youhaveto

;

have newly discovered evidence and there are a number of provisions that define newly discovered
evidence. It couldn't have been discovered before, it can't be cumulative of other evidence preset
at trial/ and various other requjVements. In addition, as lindicated p

I think it was with respect

to Representative Utvack's question, there is in the petition section of the statute a provision that says /
that a judge could entertain evidence that is not technically newly discovered evidence because perhaps
a lawyer previously could have found it through the exercise of reasonable diligence. But in the interest
of justice this evidenced should be considered along with the newly discoveredevidence in considering
whether someone is actually factually innocent. Taken together, the petitioner must show by clear and
convincing evidence, which is a relatively high burden, it's higher than the typical civil case burden of
preponderance of the evidence, you must show by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is
factually innocent. If s our positionthat that is quite high and my understanding is that only three
people so far have been able to achieve that at the trial court level in Utah.
Representative Oda: Thank you very much. I've got comment here. Now, you're looking at this, I think
almost from an extreme standpoint is the way I'm seeing this. A person that discovers potential new
evidence but not something that can be shown to be factual, that that going to give him factual
innocence, can still petition for a new trial. Correct?
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Professor Medwed:

Oh, I'm sorry. Under this new legislation you have to put forth

Representative Oda:

Not this legislation. I'm talking about normal procedure.

Professor Medwed:

There are other proceedures, you're exactly right Mr. Chair. New trial motion

procedures and appellate procedures
Representative Oda: So, this doesn't take any of that stuff away, none of those rights away?
Professor Medwed:

That's correct.

Representative Oda:

Okay, so that, this is actually a separate area from that. Correct?

Professor Medwed:

That's correct. It's a separate procedure just to prove your innocence.

Representative Oda: This factual evidence means it's something so clear that it's not something that
needs to go back to a jury.
Professor Medwed:

That's correct, it's new evidence that should be presented to a judge.

Representative Oda: Correct. So, I think it kind of sounded to me like you're mixing those together.
Okay, so I think we need to make sure that thafs absolutely clear that they're separate. The other thing
is that as some of the others have eluded, how do you control the frivolous filing for this?
Professor Medwed: Thafs a Very good question. The quality control is contained I think in the statute
by requiring newly^discovered evidence that if credible would prove factual innocence. The idea is - and
I'm not sure, perhaps Mr. Reed has data on how many of the twelvefilingshe has entertained were
dismissed as frivolous or dismissed before the hearing stage. I'm not privy to that information. But I
believe the high standards in the petition section of this legislation are enough to prevent people from
getting through the gates, so to speak.
Representative Oda: It's not necessarilygetting through the gate that I'm concerned with, it just the
filing by those who think: ''I'm just going to clog up the system." Each time it goes before a judge to just
review you're taking up docket time, you're taking up attorney time, you're taking up all kinds of state
taxdollars.
Professor Medwed: You're exactly right.
Representative Oda: So, and in the future all its going to do nothing but grow bigger and bigger and
bigger. Especially from some inmates at the prison who make it a part of their entertainment, I guess
you can say, to file these motions and everything else.
Professor Medwed:

You're exactly right Mr. Chair. With every procedure there's always a risk of

frivolous filings. I wish that were not the case. I'm sure many people wish that were not the case. The
question js whether an appropriate balance is struck between providing a remedy for the truly factually
innocent, even if it meets on the margins. There may be people who will file frivolous motions and that,
in my view, is a balance that we, as Utahns, need to strike as a normative matter for justice.
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Representative Oda: Thank you. My personal feeling is - I think we've separated the two types. So, I'm
- thank you very much.
Professor Medwed:

Thank you Mr. Representative.

Representative Oda: There are no more questions or comments so thank you. Is there anyone else in
the audience who would care to speak to the committee? Mr. Boyden.
Paul Boyden: Paul Boyden, Executive Director, Statewide Association of Prosecutors. Just a brief
comment Clearly, the prosecutors of the State are supportive of this legislation. As you mentioned
earlier, our experience with frivolous filings from inmates goes back a very long way. There's nothing
new about that What is new is this process. The factual innocence bill is an absolute infant in the legal
process. This is something that we've only been dealing with a couple of years and so we're going to
have to continue to monitor this waned see that we don't get overwhelmed by frivolous filings and see
that we keep this thing under control. The flip side, of course, is we don't want to shut It off to that
where those who really are innocent can't be dealt with. However, I personally, having been in the
system for some time have really not much concern about the kind of situation where there it said in a
police report that this witness was available somewhere and then having them come out laterand
confessing as to this thing,• I cannot imagine anyjudge who would say that's not new evidence. I just
don't think that's going to happen. Cause fra nkly we don f f appoint holograms, we appoint judges and
that's their job; They figure those things out andthey'vegota pretty good sense of justice. Bu
they're going to error it's going to he on the side on letting more in and once we^-if we let this statute
gettoo broad it's much harder to puH it back than it is to pull it back early ah^ then (^
a time. It's kind of driving over a tire, you Just can't back up easily on these sorts of things. So we
support this legislation and, we're happy, the Attorney General's Office is xjplng a very fine job and we're
sure they'll be able to work out any details they need too. Thank you.
Representative Oda: You had some questions;, Representative Litvack.

:

v

Representative Litvack: Thank you Mr. Chair. Just wondering Mr. Boyden if could respond to the
concerns that were expressed about the interest of justice that currently exist in the petitioning phase
and your opinion as to whether the amendment in lines 163 to170 would prevent that standard from
being asserted or inserted into a hearing phase.
Paul Boyden: Okay, first you have the clear and convincing standard which is wherewe started with in
this legislation. I'm sorry I'm taking them not quite in order but anyway. The determination Is based on
newly discovered evidence. When you're talking about the determination being made under newly
discovered evidence, it may not, you don't have to say this particular piece of evidence outweighs all
evidence that was ever put in on a case, this particular new piece of evidence may cast all of the other
evidence that you had in a different light That seems, you know, you can say oh well, we had this
evidence in front of us but now that we know this, this all makes sense kind of thing. Again, trying it
totaf redline, there is almost impossible. I don't see it to be a problem and I think that in the interest of
justice they'll let it in.
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Representative Litvack: At the hearing stage. So you don't share the concerns that Mr. Medwed
expressed?
Paul Boyden; Actually I don't, I don't; because it just, in my experience if there's anything that smells
like - in the interest of justice -we're really going to have to hear this so it's going to come in., I think
we need to set the standards, make them as strong as we can, but I think judges will figure that out
Representative Litvack: Thank you.
Representative Oda: Representative Butterfield.
Representative Butterfield: Mr. Boyden. Is the system burdened now with these cases?
Paul Boyden:

Yes. The Attorney General's- if you talk to the administrators in the Attorney General's

office you can certainly get that idea, yes. Thatthey are now -that they are increasing. The thingabout
it is that these things can snowball. The more success that the legitimate cases have the more trend it is
going to be for those who wahtto just file for-because they don't have anything else to do at the
prison, to be quite honest.
Representative Butterfield: Can you quantify
Paul Boyden: I'm not trying to be t o o - no, I;c>'n^^^ntrfi/;it.but-l thfok/thQ^Attprtiey: Generaris O0c:e:'-..-/'..
coiild do that.
Representative Butterfield; Regarding balance and striking this balance, why is this a better balance?
Why would the proposed legislation be .a better balance?
Paul Boyden: I think that it^s really— I don't think ifsa better balance than the originafl think it's just:
reaffirming whatthe original intent was, that this be based on newly discovered evidence. It was the
original idea. When we were talking to the legislatMre back then the Attorney G C T
really kind of spearheading it and, but we were supportive of it and we talked about how this thing
should work and we were talking nope, it should be newly discovered evidence because we d o ^
frivolous cases. I don't think it's changing the original intent. It's changing the words to be more
specific.
Paul Boyden:

Thank you Mr. Chair.

Representative Oda: Mr. Boyden, I have a real quick question* At the time of a filing for factual
innocence finding of a judge, at the time of his review is he able at that point if he doesn't feel there's
quite factual evidence for innocence that he could turn it over for another trial? Can he do that at that
time?
Paul Boyden: No. This is not a review of the trial.
Representative Oda: But can he then make a suggestion for
Paul Boyden: They can

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

Representative Oda: at that point or
Paul Boyden: I believe not. I think those who actually work with these cases can answer that though,
Mr. Chairman.

I'm not really following your question.

Representative Oda: Someone files for factual innocence filing on that to say you're innocent by a
judge, and while he's reviewing that he says well, I see some potential evidence here that may have
been overlooked but I don't see this so clear and convincing that that I'm going to deem it to befactually
innocent, but this may deserve going to another trial.
Paul Boyden: It doesn't have that option. That's not what this whole section is about. This is a
separate proceeding after the fact.
Representative Oda:

Okay.

Pau) Boyden: Which is why we're concerned aboutit
Representative Oda: Okay, Not being aware of what the procedures are
Paul Boyden:

There has to be some finality in the criminal proceeding and it could have been tried and

then upheld; There you are^ I've been involved in cases in the past where we have found evidence that
somebody really didn't dp it and usually it's the prosecutor that comes back and get the conviction
overturned/'

.

,"••''•'/• • • ' " • -: .

Representative Oda: Okay, thiank you

inthe audience who

would care to speak to us; C o ^
Jehsie Anderson: Tha nk you so muc^

is Jensie Anderson. 1 am a law professor

at the University of Utah College of Law, the SJ.Cjuinney College of Law. I'm also the legal director of
the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center. I justwanted
couple of things that I think may not be clear. This statute's been in existence since 2008 and twelve
cases have been filed under this particular statute since that time. There's been no flood gate o^
mean this statute is incredibly strict, and stagnate, Dan Medwed said strikes a balance between fairness
and finality and because the pleading requirements are so strict it's really not a statute that can be used
and abused and it hasn't been. Of those twelve cases there have been findings of
them. One was stipulated by the Attorney General's Office and the other two were through court
proceedings. I think that's really imports
In 2010 because of the concerns about the possible filing of additional frivolous lawsuits, the pleading
requirements were amended to make them more strict. So actually to address your concerns that more
and more people would file and those were amended in 2010 to make them more strict. Again, the AG
working with interested parties in the community came up with those in order to make sure that
frivolous claims could be kicked out before they clogged up the system in any way. But what our - what
our concern is, and again this only for people who factually innocence and if the judge finds at the initial
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pleading stage that the person has not pled sufficient evidence to show actual innocence, the complaint
is dismissed and there is no further remedy. There is no new tria I, there is no - it is the end.
But what our concern is and I'm not sure that we've been completely clear, but in Section 402 where the
interest of justice exception is the pleading section which says you have to plead newly discovered
evidence and, but if there is newly presented evidence that may be considered in the interest of justice
in the petition stage; What this amendment does is go only to the hearing stage. So this is after its
made it through the judge, after the judge has decided it's not frivolous and after it's been signed to go
to a hearing and that provision is left out of the hearing stage in Sections 404, on line 169. The way to
fix that would be to add the words and 3(a) after the word and on that line and that would include that
within the hearing section which means the petition section and the hearing section would be
consistent And that's our concern is that they are not consistent and that this doesn't clarify but rather
takes away a right under the original intent of the statute which allowed someone to prove their
innocence at a hearing once they made it through the petition stage.
Representative Oda: Thank you. Make sure you sign the signup sheet there. There are no more
questions, is there anyone else in the audience? Seeing none I'm bringing this back to Committee for
further questions, Comments or action.
Representative Ipson: \A/e'i% back to Committee for action?
Represientative Oda: Yes.

-

Representative Ipsom I make the motion that we move out House Bill 307 out with a favorable
recommendation.
Representative Oda: Okay. The motion is move out House Bill 307 as Committee favorably. Is there a
discu$sion on thatinotioa?
Representative Arent: I would like to reserve the right to make a motion. I have a question for this
sponsor before we go any^farther. W^'ye had a lot of really good testimony today and there are some
things you need to work out I'm a little concerned about working that out and not having a chance to
have the dialog that we need to continue to have on something this important and for that reason I
would preferto have this stay in Committee for one more hearing so we could have a chance to see any
changes you were planning to make, I would like to get your thoughts on that
Representative Dee: Thank you Representative. I think I'm trying to work as much as I possibly can
with some new found friends that have come to me with their concerns and I have committed that I will
continue to do that As with most legislation, I think that trust is in the sponsor and I think I've
developed that trust with Professor Medwed and those that are have some concerns and I think we'll
move forward that as I've stated. I would like to put this on the board and if he and I have any further
discussions, I'll circle it up until those
Representative Arent: Okay. I'd like to make a substitute motion to delete lines 16 at the end of the
line, insert the word "and" and then delete lines 17 and 18 and also delete lines 120 and 121. I hope I've
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done that correctly. What I'm trying to do is delete the section that says that the claim for factual
innocence is extinguished upon the death of the petitioner. My rationale for that is that today I was
persuaded that in some cases the family is going to want to prove the innocence later on and I hate to
take that away from the family. Soforthat reason I want to take out that clause.
Representative Oda: Any discussion on that motion? Is there any discussion Representative Arent's
motion? We'll take this to the sponsor for comment
Representative Dee: Thank you. I appreciate the motion but I think it defeats exactly what we're
talking about in the bill. We need finality on these things and obviously we want finality for the families,
but how about the person who is not being represented here today. How about the victims? How long
must they relieve this and for that reason I'd like to bring finality. If someone passes away, passes on
then the victims ought to be able to be done with it also. So I think there's a lot of things we can do to
pull the meat out of the bill and I think this is one of them.
Representative Oda: I've got a - before we move on your motion, I was just checking with our counsel
here and my understanding is that the 15 word limit even in deletion would apply and that exceeds the
15 words, so we should have that in writing.
Representative Arent:

Could I get clarification on

Representative Greenwood: I was just going to ask that myself. So, is staff telling you that even though
you delete itfs as If ft goes toward the 15 words?
RepresentativeOdai: That's my understanding. Is that correct? Want to check? Don't want to break
any rules. Okay, it sounds like deletion we can delete at any amount it sound like.
Representative Dee:

With that Mr. Chairman, can I also address that because I thought that's, I need

to go to that. Can I also make another comment?
Representative Oda: Please. Go ahead.
Representative Dee:

I think there's another avenue that we're not submitting here and it's the victim,

excuse me, if a petitioner'sfamily wants to petition the board of pardons that's done quite regularly and
a person that has expired, the board of pardons will usually kind of pardon and that services the same
thing we're talking about here for the families.
Representative Oda: Thank you Representative. Further comments on the motion? Representative
Ipson, you have a comment?
Representative Ipsqn: Oh yeah, should come back to me. I don't consider that a friendly motion and I
would resist that and I speak against the motion. I think the bills been vetted and these guys have
agreed to work on it. I think we ought to pass it out as originally, the original motion. I speak against it
in substantive.
Representative Oda: I'm going to place the motion.
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Representative Arent: Rep. Ipson.
Representative Oda: I'm sorry, go ahead.
Representative Arent:

Because of the 15 word limit I was trying to figure out a way to craft a way to

allow them to proceed without compensation but to at least clear the name and try and strike a balance
there too. So, whether this passes or not and I would encourage and I think Representative Litvack has
expreessed some ideas on how this might work to try and strike a balance here so that we don't have
someone going to try and clear, get compensation for someone who's been deceased for decades but
that we are able to do something that makes sense in case of justice and we're all trying to go here in
terms of making sure a name might be cleared but perhaps not compensation. I think that there are
ways to work this but but again that's why I wanted to keep this in Committee so we could work out
some of these things.
Representative Oda: Okay. Thank you Representative. I'm going to go ahead and place the motion.
All in favor of the amendment say Aye. Any opposed? Wilt the no's raise their hand? I think I'll just
name the yeses. Represent Arent, Representative Litvack and Representative Seetig were the yeses.
Unanimously no, accept. We will go back to the underlying motion to pass out House Bill 307 favorably;
Any further discussion on that motion?
Representative Litvack: Thank you Mr. Chair. Oh, I like humor. As I listen to the discussion both from
the sponsor and the AG's office, and the concerns
the conclusion that it is clearly not the intent of this legislation to change the underlying purpose or
intent of the current statute in factual innocence. J think we all have common ground and not wanting
innocent people in prison or jail. I would say even including this notion of interest ofjustice, even
though we did have> hear some conc^
House Bill 307, The concern is that it may have the unintentional consequences of removing the interest
of justice standard which could lead to factual innocence individuals staying in prison or jail on a
technicality and Ithank the sponsor for his commitment to continue to work with those that are raising
these concerns to find that balance. But because those concerns are expressed and are therey I don^
think it has been vetted enough and so at this time I don't feel like I can support House Bill 307 as is
currently drafted but I have a lot of trust in the process moving forward that that balance can be found.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Representative Oda: Thank you Representative. Representative Butterfield.
Representative Butterfield: To the motion, Representative Dee I am struggling why we really need this.
I'm struggling to feel compelled where testimony that seem to me to say it doesn't change it a lot, it's
the way it's being administered now, maybe I misunderstood that some and if I have to err I feel like I
feel like i want to err on the side of, of a potentially innocent citizen that we've locked up. So, if I may
Mr. Chair, I'd like to give, though I know the Represent- the majority leader will have a chance to sum so
maybe we can save it for them, but I'm still struggling with why. I don't feel compelled that this that
there's a compelling reason to change it and have potentially unintended consequences.
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Representative Oda: Well, I'll have to do that in summation. Okay. We have Representative
Greenwood.
Representative Greenwood:

Thank you Mr. Chair. I'd just like to speak in favor of the motion. I do

share some of the concerns that's been expressed today and specifically with line 120-121. I was
sharing with the Chair during this discussion that even if I pass on my name is more valuable to me than
any money out there and so if I happen to do something, some misfortunate deed and/or I am accused
of doing some misfortunate deed between now and the time that I die and then I do pass on, I would
like - even if it's a 100 years from now or 200 years from now, if there's something that's brought
forward that shows that I did not do what I'm accused of doing I would like to have my name cleared. I
don'tthink it's necessary to be compensated or my survivors to be compensated for it, but I would
definitely like to have my name cleared on it. Also with that being said/with the sponsorto this piece of
legislation I've known him for a lot of years and I've worked with him for a number of years in the
legislature and i can honestly say that when he gives me his word on something, that is that he is going
to continue to work on this, even If it does pass out of this Committee, I believe his word is good and I
s

do believe that he'll continue to work on it and some of the concerns that have been expressed here
that he will try to address them and make us all satisfied with it So, I'm in support of the motion.
Thank you.
Representative Oda: Qkay. With that Representative Dee, the sponsor of the bill care to sum?
Representative Dee; Thank you Mr. Chair. \ appreciate the comments because this is not an easy
process for any of us. I've spent a lot of hours in discernment on this bilf. This is not an easy thing and J

/agree that no one should serve time for being innocent But I think that we just stepped across the line
maybe an inch when and (know the good professor gave a hypothetical about an attorney^

.

information that they just had a person that was listed as a Witness. Let me — if we're going to use
hypothetical, let's protect the other side too. How rfiany times have you had someone come forward
after someone's been found not guilty and say "whoa, whoa, Wait a minute if you'd just done this we
could have convicted that person." But theyVepmtected from that becaus
that system. In this particular situation the public and the victims deseive some of t^
protection, even though it's not equal, but some of that protection. Here's a' hypothetical, so you have
an attorney and this is not so hypothetical I have some really personal knowledge about it, you have an
attorney that knew about some evidence but chose not to use it because his thinking at the time was to
approach the innocence from another direction, because that's what defense attorneys do, they gamble
sometimes. They think I can get a not guilty verdict better by going this direction. I bet you that on
most of the cases out there today you will find a decision by an attorney where he makes a decision
whether he will have this person testify or not or introduce this evidence or not. In this hypothetical
now we say we must have new evidence, which is what we're asking for. But then I'm going to go back
to the trial court fourteen years later in this particular case, I think that's about right, and I'm going to
say you know if that attorney would have approached it from a different direction, he might have been
innocent. What type of burden does that put on a judge to say well, did he consider that evidence or
did he not? Or would he have been better to go this direction or use this defense? It's impossible to
second guess that attorney or that jury. We don't allow it to happen in double jeopardy. We shouldn't
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allow that judge to have to make that same decision on this particular issue. If you can show me clear
and convincing evidence of new evidence, I'm all over it. That person should not be in jail, but I cannot
go back fourteen years and determine the intent of an attorney or a jury or a judge. With that, we move
on.. .
Representative Oda: Thank you Representative. To the maker of the motion, care to sum?
Representative Ipson: Thank you Mr. Chair. I just encourage each of us to pass this out and vote
favorably and -we'll-trust that by the time it gets to the floor when the entire body gets to that it will be
prepared and I trust the system and it will work and have everybody ready or he won't present it. I
know he won't do that. So, it just-- if we can move this forward and feel good about it. Thank you.
Representative Oda: Representatives with that I'll place the motion. All in favor of passing out House
Bill 307 out favorably say Aye. Any opposed? Will the no's raise their hand? Representative Arent,
Representative Litvack, Representative Seelig, and Representative Butterfield. Motion passes.
Thank you.
(01:06)

I, Ann Berumen, am a paralegal and legal assistant, and have been for 30 years. I am currently
employed by the firm of Alder & Robb, P.C. On July 4,2012,1 went to the Utah Legislature website and
found the House Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice House Bill 307 hearing of February 3, 2012 on the
Factual Innocence amendment. I listened to the hearing and transcribed it word-for-word. I added the
bolded emphasis.
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